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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jeremy Hill contends the district court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for
post-conviction relief for two reasons.

First, it dismissed his petition without ruling on his

motion for appointment of counsel as precedent clearly requires. That error is not harmless
because there are facts which show the possibility of a valid claim for relief. Second, the notice
of intent to dismiss did not identify with the requisite particularity why each of his claims was
flawed.

Instead, the one-sentence statement of notice simply reiterated the language of the

statute. As such, it was not a valid basis on which to dismiss the petition because it did not
comport with the requirements of due process.
Either way, this Court should vacate the order of summary dismissal and remand this
case for further proceedings after counsel is appointed to represent Mr. Hill.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Hill filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he tried to raise several claims.
(See R., pp.4-13.) For instance, he asserted that his trial attorney had been ineffective because

trial counsel ignored a potential theory of self-defense in relation to the underlying charge of
aggravated battery and did not present additional mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. 1
(R., pp.4, 6.)

In addition, Mr. Hill asserted that the State had not disclosed all the relevant

discovery materials as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). (R., p.8.)
Mr. Hill filed a motion for appointment of counsel along with that petition. (R., pp.1517; see also R., p.9 (arguing for appointment of counsel in the petition itself).) He also filed a

1

Mr. Hill noted he had been sentenced to a unified term of ten years, with three years fixed.
(R., p.4.)

1

motion asking the district court to take judicial notice of the underlying criminal file. 2
(R., pp.19-21.) The district court did not rule on either of those motions. (See generally R.)
Instead, a week after Mr. Hill filed his motion, the district court entered a notice of intent
to dismiss. (R., p.22.) That notice stated, in its entirety:
NOTICE IS HEARBY GIVEN of the Court's intent to dismiss the foregoing case,
pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b), for failure of Petitioner to state a valid
claim upon which relief may be granted by this Court. Petitioner has twenty (20)
days from the date hereof to show why this matter should not be dismissed.
(R., p.22.)
Mr. Hill filed a response to that notice. (R., pp.24-40.) At the outset, he reiterated that he
needed the assistance of counsel to properly set forth his claims because of his lack of legal
acumen and the lack of resources to conduct legal research at the facility where he was being
held. (R., pp.24-25.) Nevertheless, he proceeded to try to explain why his claims were "valid."
For example, as to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Hill clarified that
trial counsel had allowed the district court to consider a "tainted PSI" at the sentencing hearing.
(R., p.28.) Mr. Hill asserted he would attach a pro se motion to redact the presentence report
(PSI) he had filed in the underlying criminal case and his affidavit in support thereof to support
this allegation. 3 (R., p.28.) In that affidavit, Mr. Hill had alleged that his trial attorney did not

2

The actual request to take judicial notice of the entire file appears to be a part of a form motion
provided by the Department of Correction. (See generally R., p.20; compare R., p.21 (Mr. Hill
listing various specific documents of which he wanted the district court to take notice in a blank
space provided in the form).) That motion was file-stamped one day after the Supreme Court's
decision issued in Rome v. State, 164 Idaho 407 (2018), in which the Court provided clarification
regarding motions for judicial notice. (See R., p.19; compare R., p.79 (Mr. Hill's mailing log,
which shows he sent documents to the district court three days before the decision issued in
Rome).)
3
Copies of those documents appear in this record as exhibits attached to the notice of appeal.
(See R., pp.67-70.) However, according to the online repository, those documents were filed
only in the criminal case, but on the same date as Mr. Hill's response to the notice of intent was
filed in this case (a motion for this Court to take judicial notice of that fact has been filed
2

inform him about his right to remam silent and to not participate in the PSI interview.
(R., pp.69-70.) He also alleged that, had he known about that right, he would have exercised it.
(R., p.70.)
The district court summarily dismissed Mr. Hill's petition the day after his response was
file-stamped. (R., p.41.) Apparently due to the time it took to process Mr. Hill's response, it
issued that order under the impression that Mr. Hill had not actually filed a response. (R., p.41;

see R., p.81.) The district court did not specifically discuss any of the claims Mr. Hill tried to
raise; rather, it explained generally that Mr. Hill had not identified any case-specific, admissible
evidence to support his allegations. (R., p.42.) The district court did not mention Mr. Hill's
request for appointment of counsel in that order of dismissal. (See generally R., pp.41-42.)
Thereafter, the district court entered a corrected order of dismissal pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 60(a). (R., p.81.) It acknowledged that Mr. Hill had actually filed a response to the
notice of intent to dismiss and that it was timely under the prison mailbox rule. (See R., p.81.)
However, it did not specifically discuss any of the allegations Mr. Hill offered in that response;
rather, it concluded, generally, he still "did not present any claim, which was supported by any
case-specific facts or admissible evidence, for which the Court could grant Petitioner relief"
(R., pp.82-83.) As such, it stated the final judgment would remain in effect. (R., p.81.)
Mr. Hill filed a notice of appeal timely from the final judgment. (R., pp.43-44.)

contemporaneously with this brief). ( Compare R., p.24.) Mr. Hill dated each of those
documents on December 18, 2018. (R., pp.40, 68, 70.) Additionally, the ISCC mail log shows
that Mr. Hill only made one set of mailings on December 18, 2018 - one letter to the
prosecutor's office and one to the clerk of court. (R., p.79.) As such, it appears he did include a
copy of motion to redact the PSI and affidavit in support thereof which he could have filed with
his response to the notice of intent to dismiss, but they did not get filed as he had apparently
intended.
3

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by summarily dismissing Mr. Hill's
petition on the merits without first addressing his motion for appointment of counsel,
particularly since there were facts showing the possibility of a valid claim for relief

II.

Whether the district court's notice of intent to dismiss failed to give sufficient notice, and
so, was not a valid basis upon which the district court could summarily dismiss Mr. Hill's
petition.

4

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hill's Petition On The
Merits Without First Addressing His Motion For Appointment Of Counsel, Particularly Since
There Were Facts Showing The Valid Claim For Relief

A.

Standard Of Review
The decision to summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition answers a question oflaw,

and so, the appellate court will freely review that decision. See Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401,
402 (2006). The appellate court reviews the decision of whether to appoint post-conviction
counsel for an abuse of discretion. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004). The district
court abuses its discretion when: (1) it fails to recognize the issue as one of discretion; (2) it acts
beyond the outer bounds of its discretion; (3) it acts inconsistently with the applicable legal
standards, or (4) it reaches its decision without exercising reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life,
163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018).

This Court should vacate the order to summarily dismiss

Mr. Hill's petition because the district court did not follow the applicable legal standards in
making that decision, as it did not address his motion for appointment of counsel before
dismissing his petition.

B.

The District Court Was Required To Consider Mr. Hill's Motion For Appointment Of
Counsel Before It Could Consider The Merits Of His Claims
"The Idaho appellate courts have clearly established that it is error for courts to deny a

petition for post-conviction relief on the merits before ruling on the applicant's request for postconviction counsel." Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 685 (Ct. App. 2009); accord Melton v. State,
148 Idaho 339, 341-42 (2009); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792-94; Fox v. State, 129 Idaho 881,
885 (Ct. App. 1997); Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467, 469 (Ct. App. 1996). That is the rule

5

because the question of whether to appoint post-conviction counsel is assessed under a different,
lower standard than the substantive merits of the petition are. See, e.g., Swader v. State, 143
Idaho 651, 655 (2007) (discussing the difference between the standards).
Specifically, the standard for appointment of post-conviction counsel only requires the
petitioner to "allege[] facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at
793; see I.C. § 19-4904. If the petitioner meets that standard, the Idaho Supreme Court requires
he be afforded "an opportunity with counsel to properly allege the necessary supporting facts,"
because '"petitions and affidavits filed by a pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and
incomplete. Although facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged because they do not
exist, they also may not be alleged because the pro se petitioner simply does not know what are
the essential elements of a claim."' Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793 (quoting Brown v. State, 13 5
Idaho 676, 679 (2001)).
It was for precisely this reason that Mr. Hill requested appointment of counsel. (R., pp.9,
15-17.) The district court did not mention, much less rule on, his motion in that regard in any of
its orders. (See generally R., pp.22, 41-42, 81-83.) Therefore, the district court abused its
discretion when it summarily dismissed his petition.

C.

There Are Facts Which Show The Possibility Of A Viable Claim Of Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel, And So, The Failure To Consider The Motion For Counsel Was
Not Harmless
As the Court of Appeals has pointed out, while the failure to rule on a motion for post-

conviction counsel may be clear error, that error will not require remand unless there are also
facts which show there actually was the possibility of a valid claim. Hust, 14 7 Idaho at 686-87.
In determining whether there is a possibility of a valid claim, "'every inference must run in the
petitioner's favor."'

Melton, 148 Idaho at 342 (quoting Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 794).

6

Moreover, an affidavit by the petitioner which identifies relevant facts within his personal
knowledge will be, by itself, sufficient to satisfy this standard. Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148,
155 (2007).
Mr. Hill identified facts showing the possibility of a valid claim in his affidavit in support
of his motion to redact the PSI. (See R., p.28 (incorporating that affidavit into his response to the
notice of intent to dismiss).) In that affidavit, Mr. Hill expressly alleged two facts within his
personal knowledge: that his trial attorney had not informed him about his Fifth Amendment
right to not participate in the PSI interview, and that, had he known about that right, he would
have exercised it. (R., pp.69-70.) Trial counsel's failure to advise a defendant of his Fifth
Amendment right to not participate in presentence evaluations will satisfy both prongs of the test
for ineffective assistance of counsel. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 564-65 (2006) (holding
the failure to advise of this right to not participate in a psychosexual evaluation was ineffective
assistance of counsel) (citing, inter alia, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984));
State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 297 (Ct. App. 2007) ("A defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege

against self-incrimination applies both at the sentencing hearing and in presentence
evaluations.").
Since Mr. Hill's incorporated allegations of fact identify the possibility of a valid claim
under Estrada and Person, the district court's error in failing to first address the motion for
appointment of counsel was not harmless. As such, this case should be remanded for further
proceedings after counsel is appointed.

7

II.
The District Court's Notice Oflntent To Dismiss Failed To Give Sufficient Notice, And So, Was
Not A Valid Basis Upon Which The District Court Could Summarily Dismiss Mr. Hill's Petition

A.

Standard Of Review
As discussed in Section I(A), supra, the decision to summarily dismiss a petition for post-

conviction relief is freely reviewed. See Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401,402 (2006). Likewise,
questions of whether due process has been provided are freely reviewed. See State v. Svelmoe,
160 Idaho 327, 330 (2016).

B.

The Notice Of Intent To Dismiss Did Not Specify How Mr. Hill's Claims Were
Insufficient, And So, It Failed To Provide Mr. Hill Sufficient Notice Or A Meaningful
Opportunity To Respond
The fundamental tenets of due process require the court to provide a person with notice

and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550-552 (1965).
As such, to satisfy due process, a post-conviction petitioner (particularly a prose petitioner) must
be given notice of the grounds on which dismissal is being contemplated and a meaningful
opportunity to respond to them before a petition for post-conviction relief can be summarily
dismissed. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676 (2010); see Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793
(quoting Brown, 135 Idaho at 679).
Specifically, that means the notice of intent "should provide sufficiently particular
information regarding the basis for [the district court's] ruling so as to enable the applicant to
supplement the application with the necessary additional facts, if they exist. A notice of intent to
dismiss must also specify any legal analysis that the applicant would need to address in order
avoid dismissal of the application." Crabtree v. State, 144 Idaho 489, 494 (Ct. App. 2006)
(internal citations omitted); accord Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533, 537-38 (2003), abrogated on

8

other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 895 (2011);
Diamond v. State, 161 Idaho 636, 641 (Ct. App. 2016). "A notice is insufficient if it merely
reiterates the language of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act." Crabtree, 144 Idaho at
494.
In Crabtree, the notice of intent to dismiss provided only: "The Court, having considered
the petition and having been fully advised as to the Defendant's motion,[ 4 ] finds that [the
petitioner] has merely proffered bald allegations lacking affidavits, records, or other admissible
evidence for support." Id. at 495. The Court of Appeals held that statement did not provide
sufficient notice because it "failed to identify with particularity why each of Crabtree's claims
were unsupported or without merit." Id.
The notice in Mr. Hill's case provided even less information than the notice in Crabtree.
Rather, it only reiterated the statutory language in its single relevant sentence: ''NOTICE IS
HEARBY GIVEN of the Court's intent to dismiss the foregoing case, pursuant to Idaho
Code § 19-4906(b), for failure of Petitioner to state a valid claim upon which relief may be
granted by this Court." (R., p.22.) Therefore, it was even less sufficient than the notice in

Crabtree was. 5 Rather, like the insufficient notice in Garza, it "did not give the rationale for

4

In Crabtree, the State had filed a motion for summary judgment, but as the district court did not
properly incorporate that motion into the notice of intent, the Court of Appeals held that motion
was irrelevant to the notice analysis. Crabtree, 144 Idaho at 494.
5
Given the potential issues Mr. Hill tried to raise in his initial petition (see R., pp.4-10), a
sufficient notice have told Mr. Hill that he needed to identify the facts which would show how or
why he had been acting in self-defense or identify the witnesses who trial counsel should have
interviewed in that regard; to identify what additional mitigating information was not presented
at sentencing; and to identify what exculpatory information had not been disclosed in discovery.
The district court did make a general reference to the lack of this sort of case-specific facts in its
dismissal order. (See R., pp.41-42.) However, as it did not specifically discuss each of
Mr. Hill's potential claims and Mr. Hill was not given an opportunity to respond to that order,
that general assertion in the final order did not cure the due process violation.
9

dismissing the claims." Garza, 139 Idaho at 538. Therefore, the dismissal of Mr. Hill's petition
should be vacated for the same reasons the dismissals in Garza and Crabtree were vacated.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hill respectfully requests this Court vacate the order summarily dismissing his
petition and remand this case for further proceedings after the appointment of counsel.
DATED this 8th day of August, 2019.

/ s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of August, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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